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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Deputy Assistant Director for Operations DATE: 1 April 1952

FROM : Chief, Foreign Documents Division

SUBJECT: OSI Paper on Russian Scientific Literature Problem

1. Comments on subject paper are submitted below per your request.

2. Staff Study

1. Is the problem to "provide" the means?

2.a No comment.

2.b No comment.

2.c This is not a statement of fact, but an opinion. There has been no clarification as to what the "size and complexity" of the problem is. I question whether the problem as proposed has either size or complexity relatively speaking, unless there is forthcoming a much expanded definition of processing and exploiting for intelligence purposes.

2.d The establishment of an overall program in the interests of U.S. science is not an intelligence function.

2.e Same comment as 2.d.

2.f I feel it improper that the NSC should establish responsibilities on CIA to support a program for the benefit of U.S. science, even though it may have some indirect benefits to intelligence. I believe that the acquisition and exploitation of data not openly available is already covered by NSC directive.

2.g I do not believe that there are now divided responsibilities, except possibly under the term acquisition.

2.h This proposal decentralizes into three or more offices what is now being handled almost exclusively by one office. For what purpose and how are all publications to be catalogued and indexed in the CIA Library? This proposal implies that there is no need for exploitation of any publications except Russian scientific, as it makes provision for only that category. If OSI is to do the exploitation of the Russian scientific literature, would

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they do it for all the IAC agencies. On the one hand, they are proposing that a non-intelligence agency handle all the Russian scientific literature and on the other, proposing that the exploitation be centralized in their office. As most of the other IAC agencies have neither the funds nor personnel to handle exploitation of this material themselves, would OSI answer their requirements for information. If not, they are taking an unrealistic outlook. There is perhaps the more delicate point as to whether or not the other agencies would not object to OSI handling this phase. There might be some real feeling that OSI would not make available to them raw information for their own evaluation.

2.i I disagree completely and believe the reverse to be true.

3.a I do not concur. This is an ideal for U.S. science which should be seriously questioned as necessary in view of the money that will be required. I seriously doubt that intelligence will profit greatly therefrom.

3.b I do not concur. CIA should not support this program, at least it should not have a responsibility to support it. Acquisition and exploitation of data not openly available is a normal intelligence function and does not require establishment of responsibility therefor.

3.c I do not concur. Splitting off of Russian scientific literature represents a disintegration and decentralization of responsibilities for the exploitation of foreign publications. I believe the collection of raw information should be done by a collection office and made available to all.

4.a(1) I do not concur. CIA should not take this problem up with the NSC. The proposed draft NSCID limits itself to Russian literature. The Russian literature is only one phase of the exploitation of foreign publications. The staff study is concerned with Russian scientific literature, yet it recommends an NSCID covering all Russian literature. No groundwork has been laid for such a recommendation.

4.b I do not concur if this recommendation is intended to follow the more specific lines of the conclusion (3.c). Exploitation of foreign publications is now the responsibility of FDD. This specific recommendation is much too vague in its actual wording for further comment.



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